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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The Honorable Benjamin R. Simpson 
Henry D. Madsen, ISB No. 4428 
Madsen Law Office 
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COMES NOW, Cross Appellants/Defendants Kevic Corporation dba Lett's 
Downtown Carwash (hereinafter referred to as "Kevic"), by and through its counsel 
of record, Anderson, Julian and Hull respectfully submits this Cross-Appellate' 
Reply Brief with respect to the Cross-Appeal pertaining to the Court's failure to 
exclude portions of Ms. Shea's Affidavit. 
I. 
KEVIC CORPORATION PREVIOUSLY RAISED THE TIMING ARGUMENT 
On page 11 of Shea's Reply Brief, she asserts that the timeliness of her 
Affidavit is not properly before this Court because it was not raised by Kevic's 
Notice of Cross Appeal and/or in the District Court. Contrary to the arguments 
asserted by Ms. Shea, Kevic raised the issue of the timeliness of Ms. Shea's 
Affidavit in both the Notice of Cross Appeal and before the District Court. 
Specifically, in the Notice of Cross Appeal, Kevic asserted, a preliminary 
statement of the issues on appeal which the Cross-Appellant then intends to assert in 
the appeal. "Did the District Court err when it failed to strike the Plaintiff's Affidavit 
which was filed after the hearing concerning the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and which was inconsistent with and contrary to her previous sworn 
deposition testimony." (underline added). Kevic submits that because the Notice of 
Cross Appeal referencing the fact that the Shea Affidavit was filed after the 
hearing concerning the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment", it clearly 
raised the timing issue. 
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Also, contrary to Shea's arguments, the timing of the filing of Shea's 
Affidavit was raised in the District Court. In Kevic's Memorandum In Support of 
the Motion to Strike Ms. Shea's Affidavit which was filed with the District Court on 
September 14, 2012, the timing of Ms. Shea's Affidavit was raised and discussed. 
(C.R. 50-63). Thus, the argument was raised in briefing that was filed with the 
Court. Although that specific issue was not, discussed during the argument 
pertaining to the Motion for Reconsideration on October 2, 2012, since the 
argument was raised in the Court pleadings by Kevic, it is preserved for appeal. 
Further, as noted by the District Court, the oral argument of the parties was to 
supplement the written argument. (Transcript on appeal, p. 26, LL. 14-20). 
As noted in Hogg v. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549, 557, 130 P.3d 1087, 1096 (2006), 
"in order to be considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal 
issues and provide authorities supporting the arguments in the opening brief. I.A.R. 
35. A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on appeal for the issues presented on 
appeal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 
990 (2004). Accord Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708,117 P.3d 120, 122 
(2005) ("A reviewing court looks only to the initial brief on appeal for the issues 
presented because those are the arguments and authority to which the respondent 
has an opportunity to respond in the respondent's brief.") Here, it is undisputed 
that the timing of the filing of Shea's Pdfidavit was raised and argued in Kevic's 
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1J0pening brief" with respect to the cross appeal. (See pgs. 14-15 in Respondent's 
Brief.) Thus, the timing issue is properly before this Court. 
With respect to the timing of the filing of the Affidavit, Shea has apparently 
conceded that her Affidavit was not submitted in compliance with Rule 56(e) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, but argues alternatively, that such an Affidavit is 
allowed under Rule 11 (a)(2) I.R.C.P. It is also undisputed that the Affidavit was 
submitted after the Plaintiff had made an oral motion for a continuance to file 
additional affidavits and that oral motion was denied. (Transcript on Appeal, p. 20, 
L. 13 - p. 22, L. 21). 
As noted in Kevic's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
Ms. Shea, under Rule 56(e), the non-moving party cannot rest upon their assertions 
or allegations, but must step forward with appropriate affidavits to support their 
claims. Kevic submits that regardless of the evidentiary issues concerning Ms. 
Shea's Affidavit which will be discussed below, there is no evidence that Ms. 
Shea's Affidavit could not have been prepared and/or filed in accordance with Rule 
56(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In order to circumvent both the Court's Scheduling Order, Rule 56(e) I.R.C.P. 
and the Court's verbal decision during the hearing on August 23, 2012, Ms. Shea 
asserts that a party can wait until after the District Court issues a decision on a 
summary judgment motion and then file an affidavit which contains information 
which was within the party's knowledge and information at the time the summary 
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judgment motion was filed and pending. Such an interpretation is contrary to the 
language and the spirit of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Kevic does not dispute that the cases interpreting Rule 11 (b)(2) allows 
affidavits to be filed in support of Motions for Reconsideration. In Fragnel/a v. 
Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281 P.3d 103, 113 (2009), this Court noted, liThe 
district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (a)(2)(B). On a motion for 
reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence or authority 
bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg. Servs. Corp. 
v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 
1026, 1037 (1990)). Further, this Court has recognized that a motion for 
reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or authority. Johnson 
v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468,472, 147 P.3d 100, 104 (2006) When deciding the 
motion for reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of 
review that the court applied when deciding the original order that IS being 
reconsidered. ff Fragnel/a v. Petrovich, supra at 276. 
The difficulty is Shea's interpretation/application of I.R.C.P. 11 (b)(2) 
effectively nullifies the requirements of I.R.C.P. 56(e). Hypothetically, using Shea's 
interpretation, in a summary judgment setting, a party can intentionally or 
inadvertently fail to adhere to I.R.C.P. 56(e) and fail to file a supporting affidavit. If 
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the party loses the hypothetical Summary Judgment Motion, the party then files a 
Motion for Reconsideration and then submits an affidavit which is untimely (under 
Rule 56(e ) and which contains information which was readily available at the time 
of the Summary Judgment Motion. Under Shea's interpretation, the District Court 
must hear the Motion for Reconsideration and must consider any new evidence 
submitted, regardless of whether that information was available at the time of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and regardless of the requirements of I.R.C.P. 
56(e). Further, when reviewing the Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court 
must use the same standard of review. Thus, there is no penalty or consequence 
for filing an untimely affidavit. 
If Shea's interpretation IS correct, compliance with Rule 56(e) I.R.C.P. is 
unnecessary and/or only optional. As a result, a summary judgment hearing or 
argument is simply a "dress rehearsal" for the subsequent hearing pertaining to the 
Motion for Reconsideration. (It is not difficult to envision situations, where there 
may be a strategic advantage for waiting until after the Court rules on the 
Summary Judgment Motion to file an Affidavit because the party will then have a 
better idea about the concerns or issues which may be important to the Court and 
prepare an Affidavit accordingly.) Therefore, Shea's argument is inconsistent with 
the I.R.C.P. 56(e) and creates a potential waste of judicial resources. 
As noted in Kevic's Respondent's Brief, (pg. 16) other jurisdictions have held 
that the unexcused failure to present evidence at the time of Summary Judgment is 
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grounds to deny the Motion for Reconsideration. (An unexcused failure to present 
evidence at the time of the Summary Judgment is a valid basis for denying a 
subsequent Motion for Reconsideration. Templet v. Hydrochem, 367 F. 3d 473, 479 
(5th Cir. 2004); also School District. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th 
Cir. 1993) (the failure to file documents in an original motion or opposition does not turn 
the late filed documents into "newly discovered evidence.") 
Accordingly, it is apparent that the information contained in Ms. Shea's Affidavit 
was available at the time the Kevic's Motion for Summary Judgment was pending. Ms. 
Shea failed to comply with I.R.C.P. 56(e) and her Affidavit is untimely. It is Kevic's 
position that the District Court abused its discretion in failing to strike Ms. Shea's 
Affidavit which was filed in violation of Rule 56 (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. 
MS. SHEA'S AFFIDAVIT IS A SHAM AFFIDAVIT AND 
PORTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN STRICKEN. 
Regardless of (and without waiving) the timing issue noted above, Kevic 
submits that Ms. Shea's Affidavit is a sham affidavit and is inconsistent with her 
deposition testimony. Although Shea's Reply Brief asserts that the Affidavit was 
not submitted to "cover old ground," Shea's Affidavit is directly contrary to her 
deposition testimony. 
For instance, on page 12 of the Appellant/Cross Respondent's Brief, Ms. 
Shea asserts that "the front of her vehicle (where she fell) was wet and icy." 
However, during her deposition, Ms. Shea was specifically asked: 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 6 
O. When you fell, were you in front of the car or on the corner or on the 
side? 
A, I was I was on the corner, I just was making the first step around 
that, um, what the that light, the light on the car. 
O. The headlight? 
A. Yeah, the headlight. Thank you. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 22, LL. 18 - 25, (CR p. 42). 
Thus, her testimony is that she fell near the corner, not in the front of the vehicle. 
More, importantly, she also testified about the ground both before and after she fell. In 
both situations, she did not see any ice. She stated: 
Q. Okay. When you - - at any time before you fell did you see any ice in the 
area of your car? 
A. No. I would be cautious. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 31, LL. 15-17). (CR p. 44). 
Similarly, Ms. Shea testified: 
Q. Okay. After this - after you fell, did you notice whether there was any ice 
around your car? 
A. No. It wasn't. It was so dry and nice. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 36, LL. 19-21). (CR p. 45). 
Such deposition testimony is entirely inconsistent with paragraphs 5 and 17 of 
her Affidavit wherein she claims she saw ice in front of her car. Those paragraphs are 
also inconsistent with her deposition testimony, that the ground was dry. 
"In her deposition, Ms. Shea testified: 
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Q. And when you were walking -- when you got out of your car, when you first 
put your feet on the ground as you got out of the driver's seat, do you 
recall whether the ground was wet? What was it? 
A. It was not wet. 
Q. Was it dry? 
A. It was dry. Everything was just amazingly dry just like right now. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 24, LL. 12 - 19, (CR p. 42). 
Later, Ms. Shea testified that she did not know what caused her to slip and said: 
Q. When your left foot slipped, did you see what it slipped on? 
A. No. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 26, LL. 19 - 21). (CR p. 43). 
She later testified that the ground was dry. 
Q. Okay - - when you were getting out of the car and putting the tip money 
and as you started to walk around, did you see any snow or ice on the 
ground? 
A. There wasn't anything. There was just nice weather, and everything was 
so dry. Nothing would suggest that it could be that. 
(Deposition of Irina Shea, p. 30, LL. 20 -25). (CR p. 44). 
Ms. Shea attempts to rationalize and argue (without any admissible evidence 
in the record) that because the carwash uses water, the cars will track water onto 
the exit, the water will freeze and that she slipped and fell on such frozen water. 
However, that argument fails when reviewing Ms. Shea's deposition testimony. As 
noted above, Ms. Shea repeatedly testified that the area around her car was dry. 
Ms. Shea's Affidavit is inconsistent with her deposition and was intended to 
contradict her sworn testimony. Such an inconsistency is consistent with a Sham 
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Affidavit. Significantly, Ms. Shea has not identified any basis or reason why the 
Sham Affidavit Doctrine should not be applied to this matter. 
Kevic recognizes that when the District Court reviewed the Affidavit of Ms. 
Shea, it apparently determined that the contents of the Affidavit and "the 
additional factual allegations are still muddy at best." Further, the statements 
contained in the Affidavit were insufficient to create a material question of fact, in 
that "it merely continues to speculate that if she fell it had to have been because of 
the ice" and that there is no evidence to substantiate knowledge of the defendant 
or an adequate opportunity to repair relative to the specific circumstances at hand. 
(Transcript on appeal, p. 28. L. 24 p. 29, L. 14). However, although the 
language of the Affidavit may be "muddy", the statements in her Affidavit as to 
what she saw are inconsistent with and entirely opposite of her deposition 
testimony. 
Kevic has acknowledged that the Court's decision regarding the Motion to Strike 
the Shea Affidavit is reviewed at an abuse of discretion standard. When this Court 
examines a trial court's discretionary decision, it must be determined, "(1) whether the 
trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable ... , and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." at 873. 
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In this case, the District Court's finding and conclusion that allegations are 
"muddy" is not a ruling on the merits of the Motion to Strike, i.e., timeliness, 
and/or that it was a Sham Affidavit. Although Kevic agrees with the District Court 
that Shea's Affidavit did not create a material question of fact, the District Court 
should have indicated whether the Affidavit was timely filed, and whether the 
language of the Affidavit was consistent or inconsistent with the deposition 
testimony, and constituted a Sham Affidavit. 
III. 
PHOTOGRAPHS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE 
In the lower half of the final paragraph of page 12 of Shea's Reply Brief, Ms. 
Shea invites this Court to examine the photographs that were submitted to the 
District Court. Again, Kevic asserts that those photographs are inadmissible and 
should not be considered by the District Court or by this Court. (Kevic's argument 
that the photographs are not admissible and may not be considered is contained on 
pages 6, 7 and 8 of Respondent's Cross Appellant's Response and Opening Brief, 
and those arguments and citations are incorporated herein by reference.) 
In summary, Shea has not established any basis or foundation that those 
photographs accurately depict the premises at the time Ms. Shea fell. Thus, 
without appropriate foundation, the photographs are inadmissible and should not be 
considered for summary judgment. By the same token, those same photographs 
are inadmissible in these proceedings and should not be considered by this Court. 
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Thus, Kevic objects to any suggestion that this Court should review or consider the 
inadmissible photographs. 
IV. 
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL 
Contrary to Shea's allegations, Kevic did not file the Cross Appeal in an 
attempt to create undue delay and increase the costs of appeal. As the Court is 
well aware, when reviewing an appeal for the granting of a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court in ruling 
on the motion. Sadid v. Idaho State University, 151 Idaho 932, 936 (2011). The 
appellate court construes all disputed facts, and draws all reasonable inferences from 
the record, in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Here, the Affidavit of Shea was not 
stricken by the District Court despite Kevic's belief that it was a Sham Affidavit and 
untimely. If Kevic disagrees with the District Court's ruling regarding Ms. Shea's 
Affidavit, the time and place for appealing that decision is in this proceeding. Therefore, 
the cross appeal is not frivolous and depending upon how this Court rules, it may have 
an impact on the outcome of this case. 
Additionally, the timeliness arguments raised by Kevic with respect to the Motion 
to Strike Shea's Affidavit identifies an issue concerning the possible conflict between 
Rule 11 (a)(2) and Rule 56 (e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Although the 
District Court denied Kevic's Motion to Strike, it did not articulate or address that 
timeliness issue and/or the conflict between the two rules. Therefore, Kevic is not 
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second guessing the District Court, but is seeking a decision/ruling on the apparent 
conflict between the rules .. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of September, 2013. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Attorneys for Defendants/Cross-Appellants/ 
Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of September, 2013, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing CROSS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF by delivering 
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated 
below! addressed as follows: 
Henry D. Madsen 
MADSEN LAW OFFICES 
1044 Northwest Blvd, Ste B 
Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 
Telephone (208) 664-8080 
Attorneys for 
P/aintiffl Appel/an tlCross 
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